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**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING**

LARS KNUDSEN, an individual; and  
TELOS INVESTMENT HOLDINGS CO., a  
Washington corporation;

Plaintiffs,

v.

HIGHTOWER HOLDING, LLC, a Delaware  
limited liability company; HIGHTOWER  
ADVISORS, LLC, a Delaware limited  
liability company; HIGHTOWER  
BELLEVUE OPCO, LLC, a Delaware limited  
liability company; HIGHTOWER  
SECURITIES, LLC, an Illinois limited  
liability company; HT HOLDING, LLC, a  
Delaware limited liability company; DAN  
STOBER, an individual; RANDY  
WILLIAMS-GURIAN, an individual; and  
TARA JOHNSON, an individual; and  
SHARON LAILEY, an individual;

Defendants.

Case No.

**COMPLAINT FOR:**

- (1) BREACH OF CONTRACT**
- (2) BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING**
- (3) CONVERSION**
- (4) UNJUST ENRICHMENT**
- (5) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**
- (6) TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE**
- (7) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT**
- (8) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

1 Plaintiffs Lars Knudsen (“Knudsen”) and Telos Investment Holdings Co. (“Telos”),  
2 (collectively “Plaintiffs”), by and through their counsel of record, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, hereby  
3 allege the causes of action set forth in this Complaint against Defendants HighTower Holding,  
4 LLC (“HighTower”), HighTower Advisors, LLC, HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC, HighTower  
5 Securities, LLC, HT Holding, LLC (each, together with HighTower, the “HighTower  
6 Defendants”), Dan Stober (“Stober”), Randy Williams-Gurian (“Williams-Gurian”), Tara Johnson  
7 (“Johnson”), and Sharon Lailey (“Lailey”), (collectively “Defendants”).

## 8 I. INTRODUCTION

9 1. This lawsuit arises from the latest instance in a pattern by a large investment  
10 company, HighTower, of hijacking other investment advisors’ books of business by promising to  
11 bring an investment advisor into the fold, obtaining the advisor’s signature on overly broad (and  
12 legally unenforceable) non-compete/non-solicitation agreements, and then pushing the investment  
13 advisor out on pretextual grounds so that HighTower and/or its affiliates can keep the book of  
14 business for itself and prevent the advisor from serving the clients the advisor previously brought  
15 to HighTower.

16 2. HighTower’s motivation in severing advisors like Knudsen from their clients is  
17 clear: greed. At a company level, HighTower is trying to steal clients from successful advisors that  
18 are departing or that it is trying to force into retirement (like Knudsen) so that it can prop up its  
19 valuation as it looks to find an acquirer.<sup>1</sup> At an individual level, younger HighTower advisors are  
20 making a grab for the hard-earned clients of their successful senior advisors by manufacturing an  
21 accelerated de facto “succession plan” through false, unsubstantiated, and defamatory accusations.

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22  
23 <sup>1</sup>Several of these investment advisors are already in litigation with HighTower and/or its affiliates  
24 presently, either because they sued HighTower or because HighTower pre-emptively sued them  
25 seeking a court’s blessing for its improper tactics. *See, e.g., Reinig v. Hightower*, No. 24-cv-0360  
26 (S.D. Cal.); *Hightower v. Gibson*, No. 2022-0086-LWW (Del. Ch.); *Hightower v. McGinness*, No.  
2022-1048-PAF (Del. Ch.).

1           3.       Here, rather than deal with Knudsen in a reasonable and respectful manner if they  
2 had wanted to part ways, the HighTower Defendants have instead made it clear that they intend to  
3 aggressively assert overbroad and unenforceable restrictive covenants against Knudsen (such as a  
4 6-year nationwide non-compete), file a false, unsubstantiated, and defamatory regulatory filing  
5 accusing Knudsen of misconduct, and do everything in their power to smear Knudsen by spreading  
6 these falsehoods to Knudsen’s clients.

7           4.       Furthermore, HighTower has been spreading false, unsubstantiated, and  
8 defamatory information about Knudsen to Knudsen’s clients, including false assertions that  
9 Knudsen had “retired,” had wanted to “move on,” and otherwise incorrectly characterizing the  
10 circumstances of his termination—including baseless accusations of misconduct, including that he  
11 “stole” funds from Williams-Gurian and HighTower—with the goal of poaching these clients and  
12 trying to prevent them from leaving.

13           5.       Knudsen is now left with no choice but to bring this lawsuit to, among other things,  
14 (1) prevent Defendants from breaching their contracts with Plaintiffs and tortiously interfering  
15 with Plaintiffs’ business by “terminating” Knudsen on a pretext and blatant falsehoods, (2) prevent  
16 the HighTower Defendants from their attempt to leverage wholly unenforceable restrictive  
17 covenants against Knudsen, (3) prevent Defendants from spreading false, misleading, and  
18 defamatory information that would wrongfully tarnish Knudsen’s reputation with regulators, his  
19 clients, prospective clients, and potential future business partners, and (4) preserve Knudsen’s  
20 ability to continue to serve his many longtime clients—many of which Knudsen brought to  
21 HighTower and who strongly prefer to continue working with Knudsen given the deep trust he has  
22 developed with them over the years and the financial success and stability they have enjoyed.

1 **II. PARTIES**

2 6. Plaintiff Lars Knudsen is an individual resident of King County, Washington.

3 7. Plaintiff Telos Investment Holdings Co. is a Washington corporation headquartered  
4 in Bellevue, Washington.

5 8. HighTower Holding, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal  
6 place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

7 9. HighTower Advisors, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its  
8 principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

9 10. HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its  
10 principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington.

11 11. HighTower Securities, LLC is an Illinois limited liability company with its  
12 principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

13 12. Defendant HT Holding, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its  
14 principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

15 13. Defendant Dan Stober is an individual who resides in King County, Washington.

16 14. Defendant Randy Williams-Gurian is an individual who resides in King County,  
17 Washington.

18 15. Defendant Tara Johnson is an individual who resides in King County, Washington.

19 16. Defendant Sharon Lailey is an individual who resides in King County, Washington.

20 **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

21 17. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court under RCW 2.08.010, RCW  
22 4.12.020, and RCW 4.12.025 because (1) all or part of Plaintiffs' causes of action arose in King  
23 County, Washington and (2) at least several of defendants reside or are headquartered in King  
24 County, Washington.

25 18. The transaction by which Knudsen migrated his clients to HighTower in early 2019  
26 was complex and involved numerous contracts, each of which have differing and inconsistent

1 choice of law and choice of forum provisions which cannot reasonably be reconciled with one  
2 another. In light of the imminent threats to Plaintiffs' business and the fact that this matter largely  
3 involves Washington parties and events which occurred in Washington, Plaintiffs submit that this  
4 action should be heard in its entirety in the State of Washington.

5 **IV. EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THIS ACTION**

6 **A. Knudsen's Success in the Investment Advisory and Wealth Management**  
7 **Industry and Initial Employment with HighTower**

8 19. In a career spanning more than thirty-five years, Knudsen is a highly regarded and  
9 sought-after professional in the investment advisory and wealth management industry, with clients  
10 in the State of Washington and throughout the United States including in Arizona, Hawaii,  
11 California, Oregon, Montana, Florida, Idaho, New Jersey and Connecticut.

12 20. After graduating from Pacific Lutheran University in the early 1980s with a degree  
13 in Accounting and Finance, Knudsen worked for a period of time as an accountant until, in or  
14 around 1985, he started his own financial planning firm called Financial Security Group.

15 21. After fourteen years of success, Financial Security Group merged with the national  
16 firm Moss Adams. Knudsen continued to work as a partner with Moss Adams until in or around  
17 2008.

18 22. In or around 2008, Knudsen founded Triad Wealth Stewardship ("Triad"), a wealth  
19 management and financial services firm.

20 23. Knudsen was the primary originator of business and client relationships for Triad,  
21 which grew into a successful enterprise.

22 24. Stober became a member of Triad, holding 30% ownership (Knudsen owned the  
23 other 70%).

24 25. In or around 2014, Knudsen, along with his business partners Defendants Stober  
25 and Williams-Gurian, were approached by HighTower about becoming affiliated with it. At the  
26 time, the three had hoped that HighTower would provide back-office support, which would allow

1 their team more time to provide enhanced client service. They also had a vision of creating a  
2 national fiduciary presence disrupting the industry, while still maintaining independence for their  
3 office.

4 **B. Knudsen and His Partners Enter Into an Affiliation Transaction with**  
5 **HighTower Defendants Under Which They Migrate Their Clients Into**  
6 **HighTower's System**

7 26. In or around 2018, HighTower approached Knudsen and Defendants Stober and  
8 Williams-Gurian (the Principals) with a proposition: that the Principals would become affiliated  
9 with HighTower, and would have equity in HighTower and in their own affiliated firm, from which  
10 they would continue to service their clients.

11 27. Even with legal counsel, the transaction, consisting of hundreds of pages of  
12 multiple contracts with confusing and in some instances conflicting language, did not come close  
13 to representing what Knudsen anticipated based on his discussions and negotiations with  
14 HighTower Defendants.

15 28. Knudsen, and, on information and belief, the other Principals, anticipated that  
16 HighTower would own a portion of a partner firm operation, and that the Principals would own  
17 stock in HighTower. Knudsen and, on information and belief, the other Principals, anticipated that  
18 they would have the flexibility to run their business as an independent office with a shared  
19 ownership structure.

20 29. Knudsen and, on information and belief, the other Principals, also believed that the  
21 partnership would be one which would be mutually beneficial, and not so weighted towards the  
22 benefit of HighTower Defendants. For example, Knudsen had no anticipation that HighTower  
23 Defendants would purport to have the authority to step in and fire Knudsen's support staff from  
24 his team. Much less did Knudsen anticipate that HighTower Defendants would purport to  
25 terminate him, with no explanation, and hijack over thirty-five years of relationships, hard work,  
26 and Knudsen's dream of creating a legacy for Defendants, clients, coworkers, and his family.

1           30.     Furthermore, the Principals had multiple negotiation sessions around the continued  
2 independent ownership and management of Triad, including that its principals would operate that  
3 business independently, as it always had, including family wealth stewardship consulting and the  
4 sale of insurance. It was only during the time of his purported termination that Knudsen was made  
5 aware that the immensely convoluted and poorly-written deal documents vastly misrepresented  
6 this intent, articulated in multiple meetings, by permitting only one portion of Triad to continue  
7 (the sale of insurance). This also conflicted with email correspondence previously exchanged with  
8 HighTower that confirmed Knudsen and the other Principals would be able to continue conducting  
9 their preexisting Triad-related services.

10           31.     As noted, the affiliation transaction was complex and involved several entities and  
11 multiple different contracts, some of which have since been amended from time to time. A brief  
12 summary of the pertinent provisions of agreements follow:

13                   1.     The Partnership Services and Affiliation Agreement

14           32.     On or around December 31, 2018, the HighTower Defendants on the one hand, and  
15 HighTower Bellevue Advisors, LLC (HTBA) and the Principals on the other hand, entered into  
16 the Partnership Services and Affiliation Agreement (the “PSAA”).

17           33.     The PSAA sets forth that immediately prior to the PSAA, the Principals were  
18 employed by HighTower Defendants, and in connection with their employment, had established  
19 the “Business,” which is providing wealth management and advisory services to HighTower  
20 Defendants’ clients (“Existing Clients”) utilizing certain employees and assets (“Team  
21 Resources”). *Id.* at Recitals.

22           34.     It further sets forth that the HighTower Defendants transferred the Team Resources  
23 and related liabilities to HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC (the “Operating Company”), which from  
24 that point forward would operate the Business. *Id.*

25           35.     It then sets forth that the Principals had established HTBA (referred to in the PSAA  
26 as the “Partner Firm”) as the business enterprise for which they would provide wealth management

1 and investment advisory services to the Operating Company and other HighTower Defendants in  
2 connection with the operation of the Business. *Id.*

3 36. Among other things, the PSAA provides that the Operating Company or another of  
4 the HighTower Defendants shall pay to HTBA a quarterly management fee (the “Management  
5 Fee”). *Id.* at § 4(a)-(b).

6 37. Importantly, the PSAA does not describe a “purchase” or “acquisition” of the  
7 Principals’ business, but rather transitions and migrates the “Business,” i.e. HighTower Defendants’  
8 “Existing Clients” and “Team Resources,” as defined in the PSAA, to the Operating Company,  
9 which would then be serviced by HTBA in exchange for the Management Fee.

10 38. The PSAA contains specific requirements with respect to termination of any of the  
11 Principals by the HighTower Defendants, including requirements that, at least as to certain material  
12 breaches, the HighTower Defendants provide a notice of the breach and, if curable, a ninety-day  
13 opportunity to cure:

14 (i) Termination by the HighTower Parties. Prior to the expiration of  
15 the Term or any Renewal Term, the HighTower Parties may  
16 terminate this Agreement (1) in the event of a material breach by  
17 any Partner Party of any Transaction Agreement; provided that, if  
18 such a breach was committed by a single Principal, the HighTower  
19 Parties may elect to terminate this Agreement only with respect to  
20 such Principal; or (2) with respect to any Principal, if (x) such  
21 Principal makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, (y) such  
22 Principal files a petition under any section or chapter of the federal  
23 bankruptcy laws or any current or future similar state or federal law  
24 or statute, or (z) an order for relief is entered against such Principal  
25 in any such bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. **In the event this  
26 Agreement is terminated with respect to a Principal, the Partner  
Firm will promptly remove such Principal as a member;  
provided further, that, in connection with a material breach of  
Section 3(d) or Section 3(f)<sup>2</sup> of this Agreement, HighTower shall  
provide the Partner Parties with written notice of such breach,  
and, if such breach is curable, the Partner Parties shall have  
ninety (90) days to cure such breach to HighTower's reasonable  
satisfaction prior to termination.**

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<sup>2</sup> Section 3(d) defines the “Services” to be provided by HTBA and Section 3(f) describes actions which only may be taken by HTBA or Principal with prior written approval of HighTower.



1 *Id.* § 12(b)(i) (emphasis added).

2 2. The HTBA Agreement, the HTB Holdings Agreement, the  
3 Unit Purchase Agreement, and the Contribution and  
4 Exchange Agreement (Personal Goodwill)

5 39. In order to effect the transaction contemplated by the PSAA, additional agreements  
6 were entered into, including agreements (i) creating HTBA, (ii) assigning certain business  
7 relationships to HTBA in exchange for equity in HTBA, (iii) creating HTB Holdings to hold the  
8 Principals' (and, subsequently, the New Partners') direct or indirect interests in HTBA and to make  
9 the distributions of the Management Fee, and (iv) entering into a Unit Purchase Agreement in order  
10 to effect the transfer of the Principals' equity in HTBA to (a) HTB Holdings and (b) HighTower's  
11 affiliate Defendant HT Holding, in exchange for equity in HT Holding, and

12 40. *First*, HTBA's operative agreement (the HighTower Bellevue Advisors LLC  
13 Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement dated January 2, 2019) (the  
14 "HTBA Agreement"), sets forth that actions taken must have consent of the "Majority Members,"  
15 defined to mean "the Members holding a majority of the Units, including Knudsen." *See* HTBA  
16 Agreement §§ 1, 5.1(a). Indeed, the HTBA Agreement provides that "all material or non-ordinary  
17 course decisions should be referred to and addressed by the Majority Members." *Id.* § 5.1(a).

18 41. *Second*, each of the Principals, including Knudsen, entered into a "Contribution and  
19 Exchange Agreement (Personal Goodwill) ("Contribution Agreement"), with Knudsen's setting  
20 forth that Knudsen:

21 hereby assigns, transfers, conveys, and contributes to [HTBA]: (i)  
22 all of his personal and ongoing business relationships with clients  
23 and key businesses, as well as the experience and reputation of  
24 Principal that comes from the personal, direct and intimate  
25 involvement of Principal in interacting with clients and other key  
26 business relations (the "Relationships"); and (ii) all of Principal's  
rights pursuant to Sections 4(b) and (c) of that certain Partnership  
Services Affiliation Agreement, dated as of the date hereof, by and  
among Principal, Partnership Firm, HighTower Holding, LLC, a  
Delaware limited liability company and certain other parties thereto  
(collectively, the "Contributed Assets"), in exchange for a certain  
number of Units of Partnership Firm (the "Units"), as set forth in the  
LLC Agreement (as hereinafter defined).

1 *Id.* § 1.

2 42. *Third*, the Principals, subsequently joined by the New Partners, founded HTB  
3 Holdings, a Washington Limited Liability Company to hold their interests in HTBA (as  
4 transitioned by way of the Unit Purchase Agreement, discussed further below). *See* Second  
5 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of HTB Holdings LLC and the amendment thereto  
6 (the “HTB Holdings Agreement”).

7 43. HTB Holdings’ current ownership is divided into “Class A” owners (the Principals)  
8 and “Class B” owners (the New Partners). The current ownership structure of HTB Holdings is set  
9 forth in Schedule A of the HTB Holdings Agreement, and provides that Plaintiff Telos (which is  
10 100% owned by Knudsen) holds 623,000 Class A Units (59.18% ownership). The remaining 40.82%  
11 ownership is held as follows: Stober owns 267,000 Class A Units (25.37% ownership), Williams-  
12 Gurian holds 110,000 Class A Units (10.45% ownership), Defendant Johnson owns 26,316 Class  
13 B Units (2.50% ownership), and Lailey owns 26,316 Class B Units (2.50% ownership).

14 44. The Board of Managers of HTB Holdings consists of Knudsen, Stober, and  
15 Williams-Gurian. *See* HTB Holdings Agreement § 6.3(a).

16 45. A Manager may only be removed by holders of a “Supermajority Interest,” defined  
17 to mean 2/3 of outstanding Units. *Id.* §§ 2.1, 6.3(b). As such, Knudsen would only be removable  
18 as Manager with the consent of Plaintiff Telos, as the other remaining Units combined are  
19 insufficient to form a Supermajority Interest.<sup>3</sup>

20 46. The HTB Holdings Agreement further requires that the Board of Managers (i.e.  
21 Knudsen, Stober, and Williams-Gurian) to distribute the available proceeds from the “Fees and  
22 Commissions,” which, as defined in the PSAA, are certain advisory fees and commissions received  
23 that, minus certain costs, comprise “Management Fees” that are paid, quarterly, by the Operating  
24 Company or other HighTower affiliate to HTBA (and which HTBA, in turn, distributes in part to

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>3</sup> No issuance of additional Units can be made without unanimous vote of all Members. *See* HTB  
Holdings Agreement § 4.12(b).

1 HTB Holdings as one of its members). *See* HTB Holdings Agreement § 12.1, PSAA § 4, HTBA  
2 Agreement § 4.1.

3 47. *Fourth*, the Parties also entered into a Unit Purchase Agreement which was  
4 subsequently amended (the “UPA”).

5 48. The UPA sets forth that (i) the Principals, who had owned all the interests in the  
6 Partner Firm, would sell a portion of HTBA’s units to HighTower; (ii) that each of the Principals  
7 would contribute a portion of HTBA units to Defendant HT Holding, in exchange for HT Holding  
8 Common Units, (iii) that each Principal would transfer their remaining units in HTBA to HTB  
9 Holdings, and (iv) a discussion of when there would be a future purchase from HTB Holdings of  
10 units in HTBA by HighTower, and future contribution by HTB Holdings of units in HTBA to  
11 Defendant HT Holding. *See id.* at Recitals.

12 49. Pursuant to the UPA, Knudsen will be owed a further earn-out payment in 2026.

13 3. The Restrictive Covenants

14 50. In connection with the transaction, Knudsen also executed a document titled  
15 “Standard Protective Agreement (Sale-Based)” (the “Protective Agreement”).

16 51. The Protective Agreement contains numerous restrictive covenants which are far  
17 in excess of the bounds of Washington or any other applicable law, and are not enforceable.

18 52. Among other things, the Protective Agreement purports to require an extremely  
19 broad non-solicitation, non-hire and non-interference clause, and non-competition clause:

20 **Non-Solicitation, Non-Hire and Non-Interference.** During the  
21 term of the Partner Arrangements and for a period ending on the date  
22 that is the later of (i) 24 months immediately following the voluntary  
23 or involuntary termination of the Partnership Arrangements  
24 applicable to Principal for any reason and (ii) 48 months following  
25 the date of the last payment to Principal under the Transaction  
26 Agreement (the “Restricted Period”), Principal shall not, directly or  
indirectly, on Principal’s own behalf or on behalf of any other  
Person, except on behalf of HighTower in furtherance of Principal’s  
proper duties to HighTower, in connection with any “Triad  
Permitted Activities” (as defined in that certain Amended and  
Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement dated as of January  
2, 2019, of the Partner Firm) or as expressly required to comply with

1 any rule, regulation or code of conduct promulgated by the SEC,  
2 FINRA, the CFP Board or any state or federal regulatory entity (but  
3 excluding, for the avoidance of doubt, the Protocol for Broker  
4 Recruiting), in each case, to the extent applicable to Principal: a.  
5 contact, request, solicit, encourage or provide services to, or assist  
6 any Person in contacting, requesting, soliciting, encouraging or  
7 providing services to any Person who is (or was during the  
8 Restricted Period or during the twelve (12) month period preceding  
9 such action) a broker, financial advisor, employee, independent  
10 contractor, platform affiliated person, recruit, Customer,  
11 Prospective Customer or vendor of HighTower or the Partner Firm  
12 or any other Person with whom HighTower or the Partner Firm has  
13 (or had during the Restricted Period or during the twelve (12) month  
14 period preceding such action) a business relationship (the "Protected  
15 Business Contacts"), with the intent or effect of (i) providing any  
16 Protected Business Contact with any products, services and/or  
17 advice that are the same as or similar to any of the products, services  
18 and/or advice provided by HighTower or the Partner Firm, (ii)  
19 entering into any agreement, engagement or opportunity to provide  
20 any such products, services and/or advice to any Protected Business  
21 Contact, (iii) accepting or receiving any transfer or assets, accounts  
22 or confidential or personal information related to any Protected  
23 Business Contact and/or (iv) inducing any Protected Business  
24 Contact to cease doing business with or reduce the level of business  
25 it does with HighTower or the Partner Firm; b. (i) request, solicit or  
26 encourage, or assist any Person in requesting, soliciting or  
encouraging, or accept or assist any Person in accepting if offered  
with or without solicitation, the employment or services of any  
Person who is (or was during the Restricted Period or during the  
twelve (12) month period preceding such action or acceptance) an  
employee, independent contractor, financial advisor or broker of  
HighTower or the Partner Firm (or who is or was during the  
Restricted Period or during the twelve (12) month period preceding  
such action or acceptance the subject of HighTower's or the Partner  
Firm's recruitment efforts) (collectively, the "Protected Personnel"),  
(ii) request, solicit or encourage, or assist any Person in requesting,  
soliciting or encouraging, any Protected Personnel to terminate such  
Person's employment or engagement with HighTower or the Partner  
Firm or (iii) hire or engage, agree to hire or engage or assist any  
other Person in hiring or engaging the services of any Protected  
Personnel; or c. otherwise interfere with, reduce, or harm, attempt  
to interfere with, reduce or harm or assist any other Person in  
interfering with, reducing or harming HighTower's or the Partner  
Firm's relationships with any Protected Business Contacts or  
Protected Personnel. d. From and after the date of a valid termination  
of the Partnership Services and Affiliation Agreement pursuant to  
Section 12(b)(ii) thereof, (i) the restrictions set forth in Section 4a.  
with respect to Customers, Prospective Customers and vendors shall  
terminate, and (ii) the restrictions set forth in Section 4b. with  
respect to employees of HighTower who were actively involved in  
providing advisory services to Principal's clients during the 12-

1 month period prior to such termination shall terminate.

2 Protective Agreement § 4.

3 **Non-Competition.** During the Restricted Period, Principal shall not,  
4 directly or indirectly, on Principal's own behalf or on behalf of any  
5 other Person, except on behalf of HighTower or the Partner Firm in  
6 furtherance of Principal's proper duties to HighTower or in  
7 connection with a Triad Permitted Activity (i) own any interest in,  
8 manage, control, participate in, consult with or be or become  
9 engaged or involved in any Person engaged in or to engage in the  
10 Business within the United States or any other jurisdiction in which  
11 HighTower or the Partner Firm does business (the "Territory"),  
12 including by being or becoming an organizer, owner, co-owner,  
13 trustee, promoter, affiliate, investor, lender, partner, joint venturer,  
14 stockholder, officer, director, employee, consultant, licensor or  
15 advisor of, to or with any Person engaged in or to engage in the  
16 Business; or (ii) make any investment (whether equity, debt or other)  
17 in, lend or otherwise provide any money or assets to, or provide any  
18 guaranty or other financial assistance to any Person engaged in or to  
19 engage in the Business in the Territory; provided, however, that  
20 nothing in this Section 5 shall prevent Principal from owning, solely  
21 as an investment, equity securities of any corporation engaged in the  
22 Business which are publicly traded, if Principal (x) is not a  
23 controlling person of, or a member of a group which controls, such  
24 corporation, (y) does not directly or indirectly own more than two  
25 percent (2%) of any class of securities of such corporation, and (z)  
26 does not undertake any of the activities contemplated by this Section  
5 with respect to such corporation (other than the purchase or  
ownership of such equity securities) and otherwise has no active  
participation in the business of such corporation. From and after the  
date of a valid termination of the Partnership Services and  
Affiliation Agreement pursuant to Section 12(b)(ii) thereof, the  
restrictions set forth in this Section 5 shall terminate.

Protective Agreement § 5.

53. The HTBA Agreement contains similarly-worded clauses (together with those  
under the Protective Agreement, the "Restrictive Covenants."). *See* HTBA Agreement § 6.7(b)  
and (c).

54. The Restrictive Covenants are not enforceable for a variety of reasons, including  
but limited to, being overbroad in geographic scope, duration, and scope of activity proscribed,  
and not supporting a legitimate business interest of the HighTower Defendants, and are therefore  
unconscionable.

1           55.     With respect to duration, the Restrictive Covenants are exceptionally long. Those  
2 under the Protective Agreement purport to extend to forty-eight months after the last payment to  
3 Knudsen under the UPA, which will itself will not be made until 2026. *See* Protective Agreement  
4 §§ 4, 5; UPA § 3. Thus, if the Protective Agreement is enforced, Knudsen will be prohibited from  
5 a broad array of conduct until 2030—approximately eleven years after he executed the Protective  
6 Agreement.

7           56.     Similarly, under the HTBA Agreement, the similarly-worded Restrictive  
8 Covenants last until forty-eight months until after Knudsen no longer holds an interest in HTBA.  
9 Here, even if it were the case that Knudsen’s interest in HTBA has been terminated as HighTower  
10 Defendants have asserted (which Plaintiffs deny), Knudsen would be bound by the Restrictive  
11 Covenants until 2028—nine years after he executed the HTBA Agreement. However, given that  
12 Knudsen’s interest in HTBA has not been property terminated, the Restrictive Covenants will last  
13 even longer.

14           57.     Furthermore, the geographic scope of the Restrictive Covenants is unlawful and  
15 unreasonable. Both under the Protective Agreement and under the HTBA Agreement, the  
16 Restrictive Covenants state that Knudsen from a wide swath of conduct anywhere in the “Territory,”  
17 defined as “within the United States or any other jurisdiction in which [HighTower] does business.”  
18 *See* Protective Agreement § 5; HTBA Agreement § 6.7(c). In other words, HighTower is  
19 purporting to prevent Knudsen for working anywhere in the United States and numerous unspecified  
20 countries. Such a far-reaching geographic scope is plainly overbroad and bears no reasonable  
21 relation to any legitimate business interest of HighTower as it relates to Knudsen.

22           58.     The scope of prohibited conduct under the Restrictive Covenants is unreasonable  
23 as well. Both sets of Restrictive Covenants state that Knudsen shall not, in the overbroad  
24 “Territory,” “own any interest in, manage, control, participate in, consult with or be or become  
25 engaged or involved in any Person engaged in or to engage in the Business,” in *any* capacity, or  
26 “make any investment . . . in, lend or otherwise provide any money or assets to, or provide any

1 guaranty or other financial assistance to any Person engaged in or to engage in the Business . . .”  
2 HTBA Agreement at § 6.7(c); Protective Agreement at § 5. “Business” is defined broadly in the  
3 HTBA Agreement as including (but not limited to) “providing wealth management, investment  
4 advisory and brokerage services or products relating and ancillary thereto investment management  
5 or advice . . . .” (Article I) and in the Protective Agreement as “ the business of providing services  
6 or products relating to investment management or advice and product or services ancillary thereto”  
7 (§ 11(a)). In other words, for several years, Knudsen will be unable to practice his profession of  
8 over 35 years, anywhere in the United States and beyond.

9           59. Even the scope of the non-solicitation covenant is overbroad, stating, among other  
10 things, that Knudsen may not contact or provide competitive services to any HighTower customer,  
11 prospect, or *any other individual or entity* HighTower has a business relationship with, including  
12 “accepting or receiving any transfer or assets, accounts or confidential or personal information”  
13 related to those individuals or entities. HTBA Agreement, §6.7(b)(i); Protective Agreement, §4(a).  
14 In other words, Knudsen cannot service, for several years, even those clients that have worked  
15 with him for decades and which relationships he brought to HighTower. The Restrictive Covenants  
16 even purport to prohibit Knudsen from servicing clients who proactively reach out to him to seek  
17 his services—of which there are many. In short, the non-solicitation is a non-competition covenant  
18 under another name.

19           60. Separately, and independently, the Restrictive Covenants are unenforceable  
20 pursuant to RCW 49.62.005 *et seq.* insofar as they purport to bind Knudsen: (a) to a  
21 “noncompetition covenant” exceeding eighteen months; (b) when Knudsen did not receive  
22 “earnings” (as defined by the statute) that meet the statutory threshold for a noncompetition  
23 covenant; and/or (c) to a competition covenant that purports to require adjudication outside of the  
24 State of Washington and deprives Knudsen of the protections or benefits of Washington law.

1           **C. Defendants Johnson and Lailey Join HighTower in Late 2022, Transforming**  
2           **the Dynamic and Leading HighTower to Make Plaintiff Feel Unwelcome and**  
3           **Isolated in An Attempt to Push Him Out and Take His Business**

4           61. Despite HighTower’s representations throughout negotiations that they wanted to  
5 partner with Knudsen, it now is apparent the agreements and actions taken have been focused on  
6 HighTower’s profits, unreasonable control with far-reaching agreements and taking action to  
7 abscond with Knudsen’s livelihood. Knudsen was constantly assured that he would maintain his  
8 client relationships despite affiliating with HighTower. As the years passed, though, it soon  
9 became apparent that HighTower and the other Defendants in this action were more interested in  
10 his valuable client relationships than in continuing to work with him as a partner.

11           62. In late 2022, Hightower purchased a firm called “Sovereign Wealth Advisors.” As  
12 part of that acquisition, three additional advisors, Defendants Tara Johnson Sharon Lailey and  
13 employee Scott Sheffield along with two staff were tucked into the HighTower Bellevue team.  
14 While Knudsen spent time getting to know the New Partners and was initially excited at the  
15 prospect of working with them, once they arrived the business experienced an immediate change  
16 in culture. Almost overnight, the business became fixated on lowering expenses and increasing  
17 profits over servicing clients, and became a hotbed for gossip, criticism, and negative comments.

18           63. In the year thereafter, Knudsen received continuous requests for a “plan” to  
19 transition clients in connection with his “retirement.” While Knudsen did work on and engage in  
20 various conversations and discussions about how his clients would be transitioned, it would be  
21 over a very long period of time (10 years plus) and more for a contingency should he unexpectedly  
22 pass away.

23           64. Notwithstanding Knudsen’s repeated statements that he had no intention of retiring  
24 anytime soon, the demand by Defendants for a plan with respect to his “retirement” increased in  
25 frequency and rhetoric during the past year. This was especially noted from Williams-Gurian as  
26 he and Johnson started working closer together.



1           65.     The New Partners and Williams-Gurian also wanted to change the revenue-sharing  
2 model that Knudsen had used for decades and they began to press for larger portions of fees for  
3 various clients for themselves. Williams-Gurian in particular became increasingly vocal about his  
4 interest in leadership and plans for when Knudsen would “retire,” and the “transition plan” for his  
5 clients. Indeed, Knudsen’s “client transition plan” was referred to by Williams-Gurian as the  
6 “number 1 strategic issue for 2024.”

7           66.     Knudsen was aware that the New Partners had joined HTBA with Scott Sheffield,  
8 who, despite being titled “Partner” on HTBA’s website, did not have any equity in the HTB  
9 Holdings entity and was only an employee of HTBA and/or other HighTower affiliates.

10          67.     Mr. Sheffield’s status as an employee rather than an equity partner was surprising  
11 to Knudsen given Mr. Sheffield’s breadth of experience and client relationships, both of which  
12 were more substantial than those of the New Partners.

13          68.     On information and belief, Mr. Sheffield was effectively demoted due to an  
14 unspoken conflict with one or more of the New Partners, including with Johnson who regularly  
15 made comments disparaging him and claiming that she “almost sued” him multiple times. Indeed,  
16 the New Partners and/or Williams-Gurian went so far as to request that Mr. Sheffield never go to  
17 a meeting again without discussion and a vote. On information and belief, the New Partners  
18 regularly made false and/or defamatory complaints to HighTower Defendants against Mr.  
19 Sheffield in a deliberate attempt to push Mr. Sheffield out of the business when his employment  
20 contract expired.

21          69.     Comments being made around planning for Mr. Sheffield’s exit were not the only  
22 parallel to Knudsen’s treatment; indeed, the New Partners made similar comments and suggestions  
23 regarding decreasing responsibility and pay to Stober, or suggestions that Stober purportedly had  
24 poor performance or was “overpaid.”

1           70. On information and belief, the New Partners and Williams-Gurian were  
2 emboldened by their efforts to push out Mr. Sheffield, to pay Stober less, and to fire or to stop  
3 paying certain employees, and soon set their sights on Knudsen.

4           71. On information and belief, the New Partners and/or Williams-Gurian made a series  
5 of false, unsubstantiated, and defamatory complaints against Knudsen to HighTower Defendants  
6 and/or the other Principals, such as asserting that there was a lack of attention to Knudsen's  
7 accounts, which Knudsen unequivocally denies.

8           72. The New Partners and/or Williams-Gurian similarly began a campaign of isolating  
9 Knudsen and/or Stober, making comments such as "it is now obvious that things need to change  
10 around here," telling Knudsen that a "change" or "collaboration" was needed and that if Knudsen  
11 did not start "working differently," then Knudsen and/or Stober would be on an "island by  
12 themselves," changing agendas prepared by Knudsen for team meetings (and then sent out as if  
13 from Knudsen).

14           73. Defendants, in direct violation of the HTBA Agreement and HTB Holding  
15 Agreement (which require Knudsen and/or Plaintiff Telos's consent prior to taking material  
16 actions) then began a campaign in 2023 of terminating and/or taking other aggressive business  
17 practices toward the support staff or other employees which Knudsen trusted and relied upon,  
18 without Knudsen's consent, including terminating an up-and-coming employee of the business,  
19 Kyle Balcos, and terminating Knudsen's administrative assistant, a single mother. On information  
20 and belief all of these terminations were on pretextual grounds. Furthermore, Knudsen's son, co-  
21 advisor Erik Knudsen, experienced wage theft without Knudsen's consent, where Erik Knudsen  
22 was demanded to work six months without any pay (to offset claimed excess hours) in violation  
23 of Washington law.

1           **D.     HighTower Defendants “Terminate” Knudsen on Flimsy Pretexts and in**  
2           **Violation of the PSAA’s Procedures**

3           74.     In or around January 2024, HighTower Defendants began a series of Zoom calls in  
4 which they interrogated Knudsen on matters that were immaterial and readily explained. It was  
5 apparent over the course of these meetings that HighTower Defendants had no real interest in  
6 hearing Knudsen’s explanations, and instead were looking for any excuse to get rid of him.

7           75.     In the first of these meetings, HighTower Defendants grilled Knudsen on the  
8 consulting fees paid to Triad from the “Keeler Agreement,” which as Knudsen explained was  
9 nothing more than a tax strategy proposed by the consulting client’s tax attorney, and which was  
10 already previously approved by HighTower Defendants’ own compliance team. HighTower  
11 Defendants also accused Knudsen of continuing to offer consulting through approved independent  
12 company Triad, which they contended went beyond the “Triad Permitted Activities” referenced in  
13 his restrictive covenants. Knudsen explained that the intent of the agreement was to have Triad  
14 continue to operate as it had, with income for consulting and insurance. Knudsen offered  
15 communications from prior emails to validate this.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, as acknowledged by HighTower  
16 Defendants, the other Principals had all understood this and received consulting income from Triad,  
17 and Knudsen was being singled out independently. In any event, Knudsen offered to remedy the  
18 situation by discontinuing consulting with Triad and having him and the other Principals all pay  
19 their respective portion of restitution to HighTower Defendants for any fees owed, as the entire  
20 situation had been an obvious misunderstanding by all Principals.

21           76.     In or around a couple of weeks later, Knudsen was called into a second Zoom  
22 meeting with HighTower Defendants.

23           77.     At this meeting, HighTower Defendants asked Knudsen about an incident five or  
24 more years before, in which Knudsen had worn a firearm in the office, which HighTower

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>4</sup> Due to Defendants’ “termination” of Plaintiff Knudsen, these emails are now in the sole custody  
and control of Defendants.

1 Defendants inaccurately characterized as “brandishing” a firearm. Knudsen explained to them that  
2 he has a license to carry a firearm, but that he intentionally does not bring his firearm (a handgun)  
3 into the office. Knudsen further explained that he rarely carries his firearm at all, but did recall one  
4 time, years prior, when he had driven to the office later in the day and had forgotten that he was  
5 wearing his firearm, and had inadvertently walked into the office while wearing his firearm  
6 (underneath his suit coat or sport jacket). A coworker asked Knudsen if he “was carrying,” and the  
7 coworker showed Knudsen his briefcase with an internally-designed sleeve for his (the co-  
8 worker’s) own firearm. Knudsen specifically informed the coworker that they cannot bring these  
9 firearms into the office. In any event, the coworker’s comments alerted Knudsen to the fact that  
10 he was inadvertently still wearing a firearm, and he immediately and swiftly left the office to  
11 deposit the firearm into his locked automobile glove compartment for safekeeping. At no time did  
12 Knudsen take the firearm out of its holster in the office or otherwise “brandish” it in the office.

13 78. HighTower Defendants also asked Knudsen if he had “brandished a gun” at a  
14 grocery store or otherwise been escorted from a grocery store by the police. Knudsen explained  
15 that he had not been carrying a firearm at the time, but that, at the height of the COVID-19  
16 pandemic he was at the grocery store and had pulled down his mask to speak on the phone. The  
17 store manager called the police who came and walked with him after Knudsen bought his items  
18 and was leaving the store. Knudsen was not arrested or brought to the police station, and once  
19 outside the store the police officers made conversation with Knudsen about their need to respond  
20 to frequent calls like this given the pandemic environment, and thanked Knudsen for his polite  
21 demeanor. Knudsen had recently shared this story at a team event as he and his colleagues were  
22 reflecting on that time in history, which, on information and belief, is the reason HighTower  
23 Defendants became aware of the story. In any event, the matter had nothing to do whatsoever with  
24 a firearm, and is a clear example exaggerated and/or fabricated statements used as a pretext to  
25 eliminate Knudsen from his position.

1           79.     On information and belief, HighTower Defendants were only aware of the incident  
2 because Knudsen had previously told the story to coworkers as an interesting anecdote.

3           80.     On either that same Zoom call or a subsequent Zoom call, in or around early  
4 February, HighTower Defendants asked Knudsen about some minor personal charges made to his  
5 company credit card, including *de minimis* charges made at a Home Depot. Knudsen explained  
6 that any personal charges on his credit card would have been inadvertent (i.e. that he may have  
7 accidentally given the incorrect card), and that Knudsen does not review his charges. Rather, his  
8 administrative assistant reviews them, and then Defendant Stober—who is the administrative  
9 Managing Member—is responsible for reviewing, approving, and paying the credit card  
10 statements. Knudsen understood that any corrections which would have needed to be made would  
11 have been made. If there were further corrections, these could have been raised at the time, and  
12 that they were not would only be due to poor oversight by those responsible for approving and  
13 paying the credit card statement. Furthermore, Hightower Defendants would not have been  
14 damaged by these *de minimis* charges as its income is taken from gross revenue before these  
15 expenses occur, and the only damage would be to the partners (of whom Knudsen was the majority  
16 shareholder). In any event, Knudsen was happy to remedy the situation by paying back any  
17 inadvertent personal charges.

18           81.     HighTower Defendants also claimed there were expenses for purchases at a coffee  
19 shop, which they claimed his wife “owned.” Knudsen explained that his wife did not own a coffee  
20 shop.

21           82.     HighTower Defendants also asked Knudsen if he had ever brandished a weapon  
22 when firing an employee. Knudsen categorically denied this, and Knudsen understands that the  
23 former employee also denies this.

24           83.     On or about February 26, 2024, Knudsen was called into a Zoom call with  
25 HighTower, including Scott Kees, HighTower’s Chief Administrative and Legal Officer, and  
26

1 Sarah Musante, HighTower’s outgoing Chief Human Resources Officer. On this call, Kees told  
2 Knudsen for the first time that Knudsen would be terminated from the PSAA.

3 84. Despite the plain language of Section 12(b)(i) of the PSAA requiring that  
4 Hightower to provide “written notice of such breach, and, if such breach is curable . . . ninety (90)  
5 days to cure . . . .,” Plaintiff was not provided with *any* reason for his termination, much less notice  
6 of any “breach” of the PSAA or opportunity to cure, and instead was simply told “you won’t be  
7 surprised” and, on Knudsen’s repeated requests for a reason, that the reasons “would follow” in a  
8 written letter. Well, contrary to Kees’s assertion, Knudsen was shocked and severely caught off  
9 guard by this alleged termination, especially after Kees had previously told Knudsen that any issue  
10 with fees that HighTower believes it should have been paid could be subject to a plan from  
11 payment from the Principals who had done the consulting work.

12 85. The written letter which followed a few days later, on February 28, 2024, however,  
13 did not provide any further detail, and merely stated that Knudsen’s affiliation with HighTower  
14 Defendants was being terminated pursuant to Section 12(b)(i) of the PSAA, threatening Knudsen  
15 by copy-pasting certain of the overbroad non-compete clauses which HighTower Defendants  
16 contend he is subject, and incorrectly contending that Knudsen’s equity in HTBA “is subject to  
17 repurchase at a price [of] \$0” but that it would make an offer under separate cover for that equity.

18 86. On March 1, 2024, Knudsen responded, through counsel, by letter, and on March  
19 8, 2024, Knudsen responded further, by counsel, through a second letter. In the March 8, 2024  
20 letter, Knudsen explained that (i) it is obvious that HighTower Defendants concocted a baseless  
21 and meritless “investigation” which was predestined to identify a breach of the PSAA on the eve  
22 of HighTower’s own rumored search for an acquirer, (ii) that HighTower Defendants’ letter did  
23 not provide the reasons for his termination, (iii) that the restrictive covenants referenced in  
24 HighTower Defendants’ letter are not enforceable, and (iv) that Knudsen remains a member of  
25 HTBA (indirectly through the HTB Holdings), and that any attempt on the part of HighTower  
26 Defendants to influence the affairs of HTB Holdings, such as the rights of HTB Holdings to receive

1 distributions from HTBA, would be tantamount to tortious interference of Knudsen’s business  
2 expectancy. Knudsen enclosed a reasonable offer to resolve the matter.

3 87. True to form and consistent with HighTower Defendants’ pattern and practice seen  
4 in multiple other litigations with pushed-out investment advisors, on March 14, 2024 HighTower  
5 Defendants replied, through counsel, by letter (the “March 14 Letter”), not with any counteroffer  
6 or reasonable explanation of Knudsen’s termination and opportunity to cure, but with a host of  
7 falsehoods and threats, evidently in the hopes of scaring Plaintiff away from pursuing his rights,  
8 and an express statement that HighTower Defendants planned to defame Plaintiff to both  
9 regulators and Knudsen’s longstanding customers.

10 88. In particular, the March 14 Letter falsely accuses Knudsen of the following  
11 language quoted in bold (which is followed by the alleged facts demonstrating that the bolded  
12 statements are false, unsubstantiated, and defamatory:

- 13 a. **“diverted revenue away from Hightower and his partners in violation of his**  
14 **agreements”**: This is simply not the case. To the extent the March 14 letter is  
15 referring to the Triad consulting fees, this was an action all HTB Advisors  
16 participated in and we all believed it was permissible based on prior  
17 communications with HighTower;
- 18 b. **“improperly submitted personal expenses for reimbursement as business**  
19 **expenses, and admitted to doing so”**: As noted above, any such expenses were  
20 inadvertent, *de minimis*, and readily remedied and are not a material breach such to  
21 justify termination under the PSAA;
- 22 c. **“regularly and improperly expended visits to a restaurant owned by his wife**  
23 **in Arizona, despite there being only one active client in Arizona”**: This is simply  
24 false on a number of levels. Knudsen’s wife does not own a restaurant in Arizona,  
25 she owns an interest in a building in Arizona where Knudsen has had some  
26 meetings, none of which led to compensation being provided to his wife; moreover,  
Knudsen has multiple clients in Arizona, not “only one,” and he has additional  
clients based elsewhere who visit him in Arizona. Furthermore, Knudsen has over  
twenty client relationships that he is working on developing in Arizona.
- d. **“encouraged Hightower clients to invest in outside real estate investments in**  
**which his wife had an interest”**: This is highly misleading, as Knudsen had  
reviewed this referral for this opportunity for clients with HighTower’s internal  
compliance team years ago. Knudsen had also brought to HighTower’s compliance  
team’s attention the details of the referrals and projects and was given direction by  
HighTower’s compliance team as to what steps should be taken, which Knudsen  
diligently completed. Moreover, Knudsen had monthly meetings with the

1 compliance department where they were updated and aware of the status of these  
2 projects, and further, had not suggested this investment to clients in a number of  
3 years.

3 89. The March 14 letter also makes reference to “improper and threatening behavior  
4 directed toward Hightower staff (including bringing a firearm on Hightower’s premises)” which,  
5 as Knudsen had already explained to HighTower Defendants, was simply a one-off event years  
6 before, and as soon as Knudsen was made aware that he was inadvertently still carrying a firearm,  
7 he brought it outside the office and locked it in his car. As to his “behavior,” Knudsen’s reputation  
8 for his kind demeanor and level-headed approach in a career spanning over thirty-five years can  
9 be attested to by multiple employees and others. Any suggestion otherwise is simply a false and  
10 defamatory statement.

11 90. The March 14 Letter also, incorrectly, suggested that Knudsen’s membership  
12 interest in HTBA “has been terminated” and that “any direct or indirect interest previously held  
13 by Knudsen have been redeemed at the original contributed price of \$0.00, despite the HTBA  
14 Agreement requiring Knudsen’s consent to take such actions.

15 91. The March 14 Letter further, incorrectly, suggested that Knudsen would not have  
16 access to HTBA or HTB Holdings’ properties and systems, despite Knudsen remaining a direct or  
17 indirect member, with direct or indirect management authority, in both entities.

18 92. The Management Fee was scheduled to be paid to Plaintiffs on March 15, 2024.  
19 Plaintiffs did not receive their scheduled distribution of the Management Fee.

20 **D. Defendants Begin a Defamatory Smear Campaign Against Knudsen to His**  
21 **Longstanding and Valuable Clients and Have Previewed that They Intend to**  
22 **Defame Knudsen to a Regulator**

23 93. Shortly after Knudsen’s “termination,” Knudsen’s longstanding clients began  
24 contacting him to alert him that Defendants, including HighTower Defendants and the Partner  
25 Defendants, were claiming that Knudsen was “retired” and/or was terminated for cause.

26 94. Neither of these are true, and the suggestion otherwise is extremely damaging to  
Knudsen’s reputation with his longstanding clients and in the industry.



1 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

2 **COUNT I**

3 **BREACH OF CONTRACT - PSAA**  
4 **(Against HighTower, HighTower Advisors LLC, HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC, and**  
5 **HighTower Securities, LLC)**

6 95. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
7 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

8 96. On or about December 31, 2018, the PSAA was entered into by HighTower,  
9 HighTower Advisors LLC, HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC, and HighTower Securities, LLC  
10 (together referred to in the PSAA as “HighTower Parties”) and HTBA, Knudsen, Stober, and  
11 Williams-Gurian on the other hand.

12 97. Pursuant to Section 12(b)(i), the HighTower Parties could only terminate Knudsen  
13 upon a “material breach,” and, moreover, were required to provide Knudsen with notice of said  
14 material breach and, if curable, ninety days opportunity to cure.

15 98. In breach of the PSAA, the HighTower Parties purported to terminate Knudsen  
16 pursuant to Section 12(b)(i) of the PSAA on pretextual grounds and when Knudsen had not  
17 committed any material breach of the PSAA.

18 99. In breach of the PSAA, the HighTower Parties did not provide Knudsen with the  
19 reasons for his purported termination or any opportunity to cure.

20 100. Knudsen has performed all of his obligations under the PSAA.

21 101. The HighTower Parties’ breach of the PSAA have damaged Knudsen in an amount  
22 to be determined at trial.

23 **COUNT II**

24 **BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING - PSAA**  
25 **(Against HighTower, HighTower Advisors LLC, HighTower Bellevue Opco, LLC, and**  
26 **HighTower Securities, LLC)**

95. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

1 103. Every party to a contract owes an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing  
2 that prohibits the party from engaging in any conduct that denies or otherwise deprives the other  
3 party of the benefits of the contract. The covenant requires that the parties perform in good faith  
4 the obligations imposed by their agreement.

5 104. Knudsen has performed and satisfied all of his obligations under the PSAA.

6 105. HighTower Parties acted in bad faith and without good cause when they wrongfully  
7 purported to terminate Knudsen pursuant to Section 12(b)(i) of the PSAA on pretextual grounds  
8 and when Knudsen had not committed any material breach of the PSAA.

9 106. HighTower Parties acted in bad faith and without good cause when they wrongfully  
10 purported to terminate Knudsen without providing a notice of the reason for termination or  
11 opportunity to cure.

12 107. HighTower Parties' acts have damaged Knudsen in an amount to be determined at  
13 trial.

### 14 COUNT III

#### 15 **BREACH OF CONTRACT – HTBA Agreement** 16 **(Against HighTower and the Partner Defendants)**

17 108. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
18 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

19 109. On or about January 2, 2019, the HTBA Agreement was initially entered into by  
20 Knudsen, Stober, and Williams-Gurian.

21 110. By way of the UPA, HighTower and HTB Holdings became party to the HTBA  
22 Agreement.

23 111. Knudsen, indirectly through Plaintiff Telos, is an indirect member in HTBA by way  
24 of Plaintiff Telos's interest in HTB Holdings, and owns a majority of the Units in HTBA.

25 112. The Partner Defendants are party to the HTBA Agreement by way of their interest  
26 in HTB Holdings.

1 113. The HTBA Agreement provides that “all material or non-ordinary course decisions  
2 should be referred to and addressed by the Majority Members.” *Id.* § 5.1(a).

3 114. “Majority Members” are defined to mean “the Members holding a majority of the  
4 Units, including [Plaintiff] Knudsen.” *See* HTBA Agreement §§ 1, 5.1(a).

5 115. In breach of the HTBA Agreement, several decisions were made without  
6 Knudsen’s consent, including but not limited to: terminations of various personnel from HTBA  
7 (including HTBA’s bookkeeper, Knudsen’s secretary, and a co-advisor), withholding of Plaintiff’s  
8 son’s salary for six months, and purporting to terminate Knudsen and/or redeem Knudsen’s interest  
9 in HTBA for \$0.00.

10 116. Plaintiffs have performed and satisfied all of their obligations under the HTBA  
11 Agreement.

12 117. HighTower and the Partner Defendants’ acts have damaged Plaintiffs in an amount  
13 to be determined at trial.

14 118. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
15 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
16 Knudsen’s termination from the HTBA Agreement is appropriate.

17 **COUNT IV**

18 **BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – HTBA**  
19 **Agreement**  
**(Against HighTower and the Partner Defendants)**

20 119. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
21 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

22 120. Every party to a contract owes an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing  
23 that prohibits the party from engaging in any conduct that denies or otherwise deprives the other  
24 party of the benefits of the contract. The covenant requires that the parties perform in good faith  
25 the obligations imposed by their agreement.

26 121. Knudsen has performed and satisfied all of his obligations under the PSAA.

1 122. HighTower and the Partner Defendants acted in bad faith and without good cause  
2 when they made material decisions were without Knudsen's consent, including but not limited to:  
3 terminations of various personnel from HTBA (including HTBA's bookkeeper, Knudsen's  
4 secretary, and a co-advisor), withholding of Plaintiff's son's salary for six months, and purporting  
5 to terminate Knudsen and/or redeem Knudsen's interest in HTBA for \$0.00, and deny Knudsen  
6 access to HTBA's systems and records.

7 123. HighTower and Partner Defendants' acts have damaged Knudsen in an amount to  
8 be determined at trial.

9 124. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
10 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
11 Knudsen's termination from the HTBA Agreement is appropriate.

12 **COUNT IV**

13 **BREACH OF CONTRACT– HTB Holdings Agreement**  
14 **(Against the Partner Defendants)**

15 125. Knudsen, indirectly through Plaintiff Telos, and the Partner Defendants, are parties  
16 to the HTB Holdings Agreement.

17 126. HTB Holdings' current ownership is divided into "Class A" owners (the Principals)  
18 and "Class B" owners (the New Partners). The current ownership structure of HTB Holdings is set  
19 forth in Schedule A of the HTB Holdings Agreement, and provides that Plaintiff Telos (which is  
20 100% owned by Knudsen) holds 623,000 Class A Units (59.18% ownership). The remaining 40.82%  
21 ownership is held as follows: Stober owns 267,000 Class A Units (25.37% ownership), Williams-  
22 Gurian holds 110,000 Class A Units (10.45% ownership), Defendant Johnson owns 26,316 Class  
23 B Units (2.50% ownership), and Lailey owns 26,316 Class B Units (2.50% ownership).

24 127. The Managers of HTB Holdings are Knudsen, Stober, and Williams-Gurian. *See*  
25 HTB Holdings Agreement § 6.3(a).

1           128. A Manager may only be removed by holders of a “Supermajority Interest,” defined  
2 to mean 2/3 of outstanding Units. *Id.* §§ 2.1, 6.3(b). As such, Knudsen would only be removable  
3 as Manager with the consent of Plaintiff Telos, as the remaining Units combined are insufficient  
4 to form a Supermajority Interest.<sup>5</sup>

5           129. In purporting to terminate Knudsen as a Manager of HTB Holdings without  
6 Plaintiff Telos’s consent, the Partner Defendants have acted in breach of the HTB Holdings  
7 Agreement.

8           130. In purporting to terminate Plaintiff Telos as a Member of HTB Holdings without  
9 Plaintiff Telos’s consent, the Partner Defendants have acted in breach of the HTB Holdings  
10 Agreement.

11           131. In denying Plaintiffs’ access to HTB Holdings’ systems and records, the Partner  
12 Defendants have acted in breach of the HTB Holdings Agreement.

13           132. The HTB Holdings Agreement further requires that the Board of Managers (i.e.  
14 Knudsen, Stober, and Williams-Gurian) to distribute the available proceeds from the “Fees and  
15 Commissions,” which, as defined in the PSAA, are certain advisory fees and commissions received  
16 that, minus certain costs, comprise “Management Fees” that are paid, quarterly, by the Operating  
17 Company or other HighTower affiliate to HTBA (and which HTBA, in turn, distributes in part to  
18 HTB Holdings as one of its members). *See* HTB Holdings Agreement § 12.1, PSAA § 4, HTBA  
19 Agreement § 4.1.

20           133. On information and belief, HTB Holdings received a scheduled distribution on  
21 March 15, 2024 of the Management Fee.

22           134. Plaintiff Telos, as a Class A Member, and/or Knudsen as the 100% owner of  
23 Plaintiff Telos was entitled to their share of the Management Fee.

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<sup>5</sup> No issuance of additional Units can be made without unanimous vote of all Members. *See* HTB Holdings Agreement § 4.12(b).



1 144. Partner Defendants' acts have damaged Knudsen in an amount to be determined at  
2 trial.

3 145. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
4 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
5 Knudsen's termination from the HTB Holdings Agreement is appropriate.

6 **COUNT VI**

7 **CONVERSION**  
8 **(Against all Defendants)**

9 146. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
10 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

11 147. Partner Defendants have converted for themselves Plaintiffs' portion of the  
12 Management Fee to which they were not entitled, thereby committing embezzlement and taking  
13 wrongful distribution to the detriment of Plaintiffs.

14 148. Partner Defendants have purported to convert for themselves Plaintiffs' interest in  
15 HTB Holdings.

16 149. HighTower Defendants have purported to convert for itself Plaintiffs' interest in  
17 the HTBA by claiming to have "redeemed" it for "\$0.00."

18 150. HighTower Defendants have purported to convert for themselves Plaintiffs' equity  
19 interest in HT Holding.

20 151. Defendants have purported convert for themselves Plaintiffs' valuable client  
21 contacts and relationships.

22 152. Defendants' acts have harmed Plaintiffs and have damaged them in an amount to  
23 be proven at trial.

24 153. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
25 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
26 conversion of these resources is appropriate.

1 **COUNT VII**

2 **UNJUST ENRICHMENT**  
3 **(Against All Defendants)**

4 154. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
5 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

6 155. Partner Defendants have unlawfully taken for themselves Plaintiffs' portion of the  
7 Management Fee to which they were not entitled, thereby committing embezzlement and taking  
8 wrongful distribution to the detriment of Plaintiffs.

9 156. Partner Defendants have purported to unlawfully take for themselves Plaintiffs'  
10 interest in HTB Holdings.

11 157. HighTower Defendants have purported to unlawfully take for themselves Plaintiffs'  
12 interest in the HTBA by claiming to have "redeemed" it for "\$0.00."

13 158. HighTower Defendants have purported to unlawfully take for themselves Plaintiffs'  
14 equity interest in HT Holding.

15 159. Defendants have purported to unlawfully take for themselves Plaintiffs' valuable  
16 client contacts and relationships.

17 160. It would be unjust for Defendants to retain the aforementioned benefits received at  
18 Plaintiffs' expense.

19 161. Defendants' acts have harmed Plaintiffs and have damaged them in an amount to  
20 be proven at trial.

21 162. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
22 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
23 unjust taking of these resources is appropriate.



1 **COUNT VIII**

2 **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES**  
3 **(Against Partner Defendants)**

4 163. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
5 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

6 164. As Members in HTB Holdings and, with respect to Principals, as Managers of HTB  
7 Holdings, the Partner Defendants owed Plaintiffs fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith  
8 to Plaintiffs.

9 165. The Partner Defendants breached these duties when they, among other things,  
10 purported to terminate Knudsen as a Manager of HTB Holdings without Plaintiff Telos's consent,  
11 purported to terminate Plaintiff Telos as a member of HTB Holdings without Plaintiff Telos's  
12 consent, denying Plaintiffs' access to HTB Holdings' systems and records, and failing to distribute  
13 to Plaintiffs' their portion of the Management Fee.

14 166. Partner Defendants' acts have damaged Knudsen in an amount to be determined at  
15 trial.

16 167. Moreover, and separately, Knudsen would be irreparably harmed if forced to lose  
17 his client relationships and not permitted to continue his business, and injunctive relief preventing  
18 Knudsen's termination from the HTB Holdings Agreement is appropriate.

19 **COUNT IX**

20 **TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE**  
21 **(Against All Defendants)**

22 168. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
23 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

24 169. Plaintiffs have a business expectancy with respect to their clients. Many of these  
25 clients have been serviced by Plaintiffs for decades, and planned to continue to be serviced by  
26 Plaintiff for years in the future.

1 170. Defendants are well-aware of Plaintiffs' client relationships; indeed, part of why  
2 Defendants formed a relationship with Plaintiffs was because of Plaintiffs' longstanding client  
3 relationships.

4 171. A number of clients have reached out to Knudsen to inform him that Defendants  
5 have—falsely—represented that Knudsen retired and, when pressed, subsequently claimed—again,  
6 falsely—that Plaintiff Knudson was terminated because of wrongdoing.

7 172. In the March 14 Letter, Defendants insinuated that they intended to share the Form  
8 U5 detailing Knudsen's (alleged) wrongdoing which would include false and defamatory  
9 statements with clients.

10 173. Defendants' interference with Plaintiffs' business relationships has been  
11 accomplished through improper means and for an improper purpose.

12 174. Defendants' interference with Plaintiffs' business relationships have damaged them  
13 in an amount to be proven at trial.

14 175. Moreover, and separately, Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed by further threats  
15 to their business relationships, and equitable relief is appropriate.

16 **COUNT X**

17 **DECLARATORY JUDGMENT**  
18 **(Against All Defendants)**

19 176. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
20 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

21 177. As set forth herein, the Restrictive Covenants, including those found in the  
22 Protective Agreement and the HTBA Agreement, are overbroad and unenforceable, including as  
23 to duration, geographic scope, and scope of purportedly prohibited conduct. The Restrictive  
24 Covenants are also unenforceable because they are far broader than necessary to protect any  
25 legitimate business interest of Defendants (if any).

1 178. As set forth herein, the Restrictive Covenants are further, and separately,  
2 unenforceable under RCW 49.62.005 *et seq.*

3 179. Defendants have indicated they intend to enforce the Restrictive Covenants.

4 180. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Restrictive Covenants are  
5 not enforceable.

6 181. Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover the greater of their actual damages or a  
7 statutory penalty of five thousand dollars, plus their reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs  
8 incurred in this proceeding, pursuant to RCW 49.62.080(3).

9 **COUNT XI**

10 **INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**  
11 **(Against All Defendants)**

12 182. Plaintiffs hereby repeat, reallege, and incorporate by reference each and every  
13 allegation contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth in full herein.

14 183. Plaintiffs have a clear legal or equitable right to prevent Defendants from (1) filing  
15 a Form U5 or IAPD Notice of Termination containing false, unsubstantiated, or defamatory  
16 information about Knudsen; (2) disseminating any such filing to anyone other than a regulatory  
17 authority, or suggesting or stating that anything in such a filing is in any way supported or endorsed  
18 by any such government or regulatory authority; (3) taking any action with respect to HTB  
19 Holdings in violation of the HTB Holdings Agreement; (4) taking any action with respect to HTBA  
20 in violation of the HTBA Agreement; (5) enforcing the overbroad, unenforceable, and  
21 unconscionable restrictive covenants contained in the parties' various agreements against Knudsen;  
22 and (6) otherwise unlawfully interfering with Plaintiffs' relationships with their clients and  
23 prospects.

24 184. Plaintiffs have a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right.

25 185. The acts complained of herein by the Plaintiffs are either resulting in, or will result  
26 in, actual and sustained injury to the Plaintiffs.

1           186. The Court should issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from  
2 performing the above-referenced actions during the pendency of this action.

3           187. The Court should issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from the  
4 above-referenced actions.

5   **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

6           WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray for the following relief:

7           A.       That the Court award damages with prejudgment interest to Plaintiffs in an amount  
8 to be determined at trial;

9           B.       That the Court award Plaintiffs their attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs as  
10 permitted under the law, contract, and equity, including under RCW 49.62.080;

11          C.       That the Court grant injunctive relief, including, but not limited to, preventing  
12 Defendants from (1) filing a Form U5 or IAPD Notice of Termination containing false,  
13 unsubstantiated, or defamatory information about Knudsen; (2) disseminating any such filing to  
14 anyone other than a regulatory authority, or suggesting or stating that anything in such a filing is  
15 in any way supported or endorsed by any such government or regulatory authority; (3) taking any  
16 action with respect to HTB Holdings in violation of the HTB Holdings Agreement; (4) taking any  
17 action with respect to HTBA in violation of the HTBA Agreement; (5) enforcing the overbroad,  
18 unenforceable, and unconscionable restrictive covenants contained in the parties' various  
19 agreements against Knudsen; and (6) otherwise unlawfully interfering with Plaintiffs'  
20 relationships with their clients and prospects

21          D.       That the Court enter a declaratory judgment that the Restrictive Covenants are not  
22 enforceable;

23          E.       For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and proper.

1 Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2024.

2 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP

3  
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